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Although vulnerability does not have an express legal basis in international human rights law, 
human rights courts, and particularly the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), have 
increasingly drawn on this concept in their jurisprudence. The ECtHR has developed an 
important line of cases concerning migrant children, which it considers as particularly vulnerable 
to physical and mental harm during the migratory process. The Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (IACtHR) also anchored this notion in an influential advisory opinion on the 
rights of migrant children. This article critically examines this case-law against the existing 
scholarship on vulnerability and the legal framework on human rights protection. It argues that 
the concept of vulnerability, when complemented by considerations of best interests of the child, 
can operate as a magnifying glass for State obligations, exposing a greater duty of protection 
and care vis-à-vis migrant children. It suggests that the human rights courts should deploy a 
more substantial approach to migrant children’s rights based on the concept of vulnerability and 
on the principle of best interests of the child. Above all, this approach would foster stronger 
protection of these children’s rights in the long term. In addition, if effectively applied, it would 
allow the human rights courts to avoid stigmatising the most exposed individuals in the ongoing 
global migration crisis.  
  
                                                          
 Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Exeter, UK. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 9th 
Annual Conference of the Canadian Association for Refugee and Forced Migration Studies in Winnipeg, 
Canada on 12 May 2016, and at the Conference of the Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford on 17 
March 2017. I am grateful to the participants for their helpful comments. I would like to express a special 
word of thanks to Professor Michael N. Schmitt, Professor Helena Wray and Dr Kubo Mačák for their 
valuable insights and instructive comments. Any errors or omissions are, of course, entirely mine. 
2 WORKING PAPER  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 2 
II. THE COMPOSITE NATURE OF THE CONCEPT OF VULNERABILITY .................................. 6 
A. Group Dimension ............................................................................................................... 6 
B. Contextual Analysis ............................................................................................................. 9 
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VULNERABILITY AND BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
 ....................................................................................................................................................... 14 
A. Complementarity ............................................................................................................... 14 
B. Instrumentalization ........................................................................................................... 19 
IV. TOWARDS THE IMPOSITION OF ENHANCED STATE OBLIGATIONS? ............................ 21 
A. ECtHR: Emphasis on Positive Obligations .................................................................. 21 
B. IACtHR: Potential for Innovation .................................................................................. 24 
V. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................... 26 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the 
number of displaced people worldwide is currently at the highest level ever recorded.1 
Alarmingly, it is reported that more than one in five migrants arriving in Europe in 2015 
were children.2  They are commonly considered to be particularly exposed to the risk of 
physical and mental abuse during the migratory process.3  
                                                          
1 Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2015, UNHCR (June 20, 2016), available at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/unhcrsharedmedia/2016/2016-06-20-global-trends/2016-06-14-Global-
Trends-2015.pdf; Over one million sea arrivals reach Europe in 2015, UNHCR (Dec. 30, 2015), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/5683d0b56.html.  
2 Data Brief: Migration of Children to Europe, IOM and UNICEF (Nov. 30, 2015), available at 
http://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/press_release/file/IOM-UNICEF-Data-Brief-Refugee-and-
Migrant-Crisis-in-Europe-30.11.15.pdf. See also Uprooted. The growing crisis for refugee and migrant children, 
UNICEF (Sept. 15, 2016), available at 
https://www.unicef.org/publications/files/Uprooted_growing_crisis_for_refugee_and_migrant_children.
pdf, at 7 (estimating that in 2016 nearly one in every 200 children in the world was a child refugee and that 
the number of child refugees under the UNHCR’s mandate between 2005 and 2015 has more than doubled). 
3 Id.; see also, The refugee crisis in Europe: the UK’s role in protecting the rights of unaccompanied and separated children, 
UNICEF (June 16, 2016), available at http://www.unicef.org.uk/Latest/Publications/The-refugee-crisis-in-
Europe; Neither safe nor sound: Unaccompanied children on the coastline of the English Channel and the North Sea, 
UNICEF (June 16, 2016), available at http://www.unicef.org.uk/Latest/Publications/Neither-Safe-Nor-
Sound/.  
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This is especially concerning in relation to unaccompanied or separated migrant 
children due to the lack of adult supervision.4 Unaccompanied children are those 
individuals below the age of 18 years5 “who have been separated from both parents and 
other relatives and are not being cared for by an adult who, by law or custom, is responsible 
for doing so”.6 Separated children are those who “have been separated from both parents, 
or from their previous legal or customary primary caregiver, but not necessarily from other 
relatives”.7  
However, even children migrating with their parents or caregivers are not automatically 
sheltered from these risks. For instance, they may be exposed to harm when placed with 
their families in reception and detention centres that are not adapted to receive families.8 
Accordingly, migrant children, accompanied or not, can be vulnerable in relation to the 
context and external environment in which they are placed. Therefore, this article focuses 
on both accompanied and unaccompanied or separated migrant children, as they may be 
equally vulnerable.  
Vulnerability is commonly understood as the state of being “exposed to the possibility 
of being attacked or harmed, either physically or emotionally”.9 For Turner, harm is a 
central element as “vulnerability defines our humanity”10 of embodied creatures who are 
subjected to suffering.11 However, as deftly suggested by Grear, “vulnerability need not be 
conceived as a monolithic concept”12 and can allow for nuances and different degrees of 
complexity. Vulnerability is therefore universal and particular at the same time: it is 
universal insofar as it is based on the embodiment of human beings who by their very 
                                                          
4 Unaccompanied refugee and migrant children in urgent need of protection, UNICEF (May 6, 2016), available at 
http://www.unicef.org.uk/Media-centre/Press-releases/Unaccompanied-refugee-and-migrant-children-in-
urgent-need-of-protection-warns-UNICEF/; Asylum applications considered to be unaccompanied minors – 2015, 
EUROSTAT (Aug. 25, 2016), available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/tps00194 
(exposing that 95,000 asylum applications were lodged by unaccompanied or separated children in Europe 
in 2015). 
5 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 1 (“For the purposes of 
the present Convention, a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the 
law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier”).  
6 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 6: Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children 
Outside their Country of Origin, ¶ 7, CRC/GC/2005/6 (May 17, 2005). 
7 Id. ¶ 8. 
8 Muskhadzhiyeva and others v. Belgium, App. No. 41442/07, ¶ 61 (EUR. CT. H.R., Jan. 19, 2010) 
(emphasising the situation of extreme stress of the mother who were unable to protect her children while in 
detention). See also MARIE-BENEDICTE DEMBOUR, WHEN HUMANS BECOME MIGRANTS. STUDY OF THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS WITH AN INTER-AMERICAN COUNTERPOINT (2015) at 394 (for a 
critical and insightful analysis of the ECtHR’s decision in the case of Muskhadzhiyeva and others v Belgium). 
9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2017), sub verbo “vulnerable, adj.”, available at 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/vulnerable. 
10 BRYAN TURNER, VULNERABILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2006) at 1 (also presenting vulnerability as the 
common basis of human rights). 
11 Id. at 27 (discussing both physical and psychological dimensions of vulnerability based on suffering). 
12 ANNA GREAR, REDIRECTING HUMAN RIGHTS. FACING THE CHALLENGES OF CORPORATE LEGAL 
HUMANITY (2010) at 128. 
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nature are capable of being harmed; it is also particular since it relates to the different 
contexts in which human beings can be protected from harm. 13 As pointed out by Turner, 
vulnerability is our common universal shared characteristic which nevertheless “forces us 
into social dependency and social connectedness”14 as we seek protection from harm.  
This protection is provided by different institutions, which include the State, the family, 
or the community.15 In this regard, Fineman’s definition of vulnerability as “the 
characteristic that positions us in relation to each other as human beings and also suggests 
a relationship of responsibility between the state and its institutions and the individual”16 
is markedly accurate.  Precisely, this relationship between States and individuals is at the 
core of the development of human rights in international law.17 States are required to 
protect the vulnerable individual from harm in international human rights law.18 However, 
the use of the concept of vulnerability has been heavily criticised by scholars who pointed 
out the dangers of allowing for paternalistic and stigmatising views of groups of individuals 
to permeate the mainstream culture, focusing on State assistance and not on building 
resilience.19 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has deployed its own conception of 
vulnerability insofar as migrant children are concerned.20 Across the Atlantic, the Inter-
                                                          
13 Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251, 268-9 (2010-
2011). 
14 TURNER, supra n10 at 10. 
15 Id. at 28 (arguing that the creation of institutions such as family, religion, rituals, political institutions, serve 
the purpose of reducing vulnerability and providing security). 
16 Fineman, supra note 13 at 255. 
17 OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2d ed. 2014) at 13 (explaining that 
“human rights have a logic of their own [as] they have originated in domestic constitutional documents [and 
as] they regulate the relationships between the State and individuals under their jurisdiction, rather than 
simply relationships between States”).  
18 See in particular the rules on prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment (art. 
7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; art. 3 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights; art. 2 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment). 
19 See Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability, Resilience, and LGBT Youth 23 TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL 
RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 307 at 315 (2014) (arguing that “[t]he conception of vulnerability as belonging only 
to certain groups or “populations” of people is pernicious, and distorts the nature and effects of legal and 
social problems. It can actually serve to worsen the position of those “populations” it seeks to protect.”); 
Sylvie Da Lomba, Vulnerability, Irregular Migrants’ Health-Related Rights and the European Court of Human Rights 
21 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW 339 at 345 (2014) (arguing that group vulnerability can lead to 
stigmatisation of populations and to paternalistic approaches); Lourdes Peroni & Alexandra Timmer, 
Vulnerable groups: The promise of an Emerging Concept in European Human Rights Convention Law 11 INT J CONST 
LAW 1056 at 1070 (2013) (arguing that the ECtHR’s reasoning in relation to the concept of vulnerability 
“risks reinforcing the vulnerability of certain groups by essentializing, stigmatizing, and paternalizing them”). 
20 This article has undertaken a comprehensive analysis of ECtHR’s decisions to date which involved migrant 
children (unaccompanied, separated or migrating with family members) and which at the same time explicitly 
referred to the concept of vulnerability. See Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, App. No. 
13178/03 (EUR. CT. H.R., Oct. 12, 2006); Muskhadzhiyeva and others v. Belgium, supra note 8; Rahimi v. 
Greece, App. No. 8687/08 (EUR. CT. H.R., Apr. 5, 2011); Kanagaratnam and others v. Belgium, App. No. 
15297/09 (EUR. CT. H.R., Dec. 13, 2011); Popov v. France, App. Nos. 39472/07 and 39474/07 (EUR. CT. 
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American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) anchored this notion in an influential 2014 
advisory opinion on the rights of migrant children.21 Both courts recognise the 
vulnerability of migrant children in the wider context of migration, taking into account the 
multiple risks to which they are particularly exposed,22 and acknowledging the implications 
of the principle of best interests of the child.23  
This article focuses primarily on the analysis of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR,24 using 
examples from the IACtHR’s jurisprudence25 as a comparative element supplementing the 
study. It argues that the concept of vulnerability, when complemented by considerations 
of best interests of the child, can operate as a magnifying glass for State obligations, 
exposing a greater duty of protection and care vis-à-vis migrant children. If both human 
rights courts apply this concept effectively in its future cases, it could achieve a substantive 
step-change in the protection of migrant children’s rights with long-term positive effects. 
In order to verify this argument, the article critically examines the use of vulnerability by 
the ECtHR and the IACtHR against the existing legal and theoretical frameworks of 
human rights protection and evaluates the implications for the effective protection of 
migrant children’s rights.  
The analysis proceeds in four consecutive steps. Firstly, the article examines the nature 
of the concept of vulnerability against the background of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on 
the protection of migrant children’s rights. Secondly, the article evaluates the relationship 
between vulnerability and the principle of best interest of the child, assessing its advantages 
and limits. Thirdly, the article evaluates the implications of the concept of vulnerability for 
State obligations, considering whether it necessitates modifications of the nature or degree 
of these obligations in this area. Finally, the article draws conclusions on the effectiveness 
of the use of the concept of vulnerability vis-à-vis the dangers inherent to the 
                                                          
H.R.,  Jan. 19, 2012); Tarahkel v. Switzerland App. No. 29217/12 (EUR. CT. H.R., Nov. 4, 2014); Abdullahi 
Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v. Malta, App. No. 25794/13 and 28151/13 (EUR. CT. H.R., Nov. 22, 2016). 
21 Rights and Guarantees of Children in the Context of Migration and/or in need of International Protection,  
Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. (ser. A) No.21 (Aug. 19, 2014). 
22 Id. ¶ 90 (emphasising the risks of sexual exploitation); Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, 
supra note 20 ¶ 56 (condemning the “legal void” for the protection of minors held in detention centres). 
23 Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, supra note 21 ¶ 103 (proposing an evaluation of the best interest of the child 
after examination of migrant children’s vulnerability); Rahimi v. Greece, supra note 20 ¶ 109 (emphasising 
the importance of the principle of best interest of the child). 
24 The selection of ECtHR decisions observed the following criteria: in the field of articles 3 and 5 ECHR, 
all decisions involved migrant children (unaccompanied, separated or migrating with family members) and 
at the same time explicitly referred to the concept of vulnerability. In the field of article 8 ECHR, all decisions 
related to migrant children but not always explicitly referred to the concept of vulnerability (which allowed 
for the argument to be put forward that the ECtHR still has to improve the use of vulnerability in this area 
– see infra at section III.A). Decisions of the ECtHR relating to children (nationals) in general were also used 
as a point of comparison (see infra at section IV). 
25 There are fewer IACtHR decisions relating to migrant children specifically. The Advisory Opinion OC-
21/14, supra note 21 is the main reference in this regard. Decisions relating to children (including nationals) 
were used as a point of comparison insofar as they referred to the concept of vulnerability.  
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stigmatisation of the most underprivileged individuals in the current context of the global 
migration crisis.  
II. THE COMPOSITE NATURE OF THE CONCEPT OF VULNERABILITY 
A. Group Dimension 
The ECtHR tends to emphasise the group dimension of the concept of vulnerability26 
and not its individual and universal aspects.27 For instance, it has used this concept in a 
variety of situations relating to groups of people such as ethnic minorities,28 asylum-
seekers,29 and the mentally ill.30 The ECtHR referred to vulnerability for the first time in 
the context of the protection of minority rights, namely when it designated the Roma 
minority as vulnerable in Chapman v the United Kingdom.31  
Nonetheless, if the foundation of vulnerability can be situated in the embodied nature 
of all human beings,32 who by their physical constitution are subjected to the possibility of 
harm and depend upon one another,33 not only a few groups of people should be 
                                                          
26 See Peroni & Timmer, supra note 19 at 1056 (arguing that the ECtHR has deployed the concept of group 
vulnerability).  
27 See Fineman, Equality, Autonomy, and the Vulnerable Subject in Law and Politics, in VULNERABILITY: 
REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS 18, 22 (Martha Albertson 
Fineman & Anna Grear eds., 2013) (affirming that “[h]uman vulnerability arises in the first place from our 
embodiement, which carries with it the imminent or ever-present possibility of harm, injury, and 
misfortune”); Turner, supra note 10 at 25-6 (arguing that every human being can be considered as 
vulnerable). 
28 See D.H. and others v. the Czech Republic, App. No. 57325/00, ¶ 182 (Nov. 13, 2007), (about the 
vulnerability of Roma minorities). 
29 See M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, App. No. 30696/09, ¶ 251 (Jan. 21, 2011) (on the vulnerability of asylum-
seekers). See DEMBOUR, supra note 8 at 403 (for a critical analysis of M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece). The 
ECtHR has subsequently confirmed the vulnerability of adult asylum seekers. See Aden Ahmed v. Malta, 
App. No. 55352/12, ¶ 97 (July 23, 2013); Mahamed Jama v. Malta, App. No. 10290/13, ¶ 100 (Nov. 26, 
2015). 
30 See Raffray Taddei v. France, App. No. 36435/07, ¶ 63 (Dec. 21, 2010) (emphasising the vulnerability of 
the applicant, a prisoner suffering from a number of medical conditions including anorexia); Bamouhammad 
v. Belgium, App. No. 47687/13, ¶ 121 (Nov. 17, 2015)(providing that prisoners with mental health issues 
are more vulnerable than ordinary prisoners). 
31 Chapman v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 27238/95, ¶ 96 (Jan. 18, 2001) (affirming that the recognition 
of their vulnerability led to the imposition upon the State of an obligation to take into account “special 
considerations” in relation to their specific needs and different lifestyle insofar as policy-making and 
decision-making processes relating to them are concerned). 
32 See Fineman, supra note 27 at 22; TURNER, supra note 10 at 25-6; GREAR, supra n12 at 137.   
33 See TURNER, supra note 10 at 26 (arguing that “[h]uman beings are ontologically vulnerable and insecure, 
and their natural environment, doubtful. In order to protect themselves from the uncertainties of the 
everyday world, they must build social institutions”).  
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considered as vulnerable. Vulnerability therefore has a universal reach34 and the concept 
should be applied to all human beings. However, as affirmed by Fineman, “while human 
vulnerability is universal, constant, and complex, it is also particular. While all human 
beings stand in a position of constant vulnerability, we are individually positioned 
differently.”35 Some individuals may be better sheltered from harm as they may receive 
protection from their families, communities and State, whereas other individuals may not 
receive the same degree of protection.36 The assertion that some groups of people can be 
more vulnerable than others can only be accepted as a starting point. The analysis of the 
context, in which the individuals evolve, and their particularities vis-à-vis the groups to 
which they belong should also be taken into account.  
In the case of the protection of migrant children’s rights, vulnerability encompasses 
aspects linked to the fragile nature of all human beings and it equally relates to the 
belonging to one or more social groups. The ECtHR has emphasised that migrant children 
are in an extremely vulnerable situation as they are not only minors, but also aliens in an 
irregular situation in a foreign country who may not even be accompanied by an adult.37 
This is certainly a positive step towards a more holistic approach to risks inherent in child 
migration.  
Additionally, the ECtHR should arguably also consider gender aspects, as 
unaccompanied or separated girls are generally considered to be more vulnerable to sexual 
exploitation and abuses when migrating on their own.38 Disability is another important 
concern and should be taken into account by the Court, as migrant children with 
disabilities are more frequently exposed to abuse, exploitation and neglect.39 Trauma, stress 
and mental health issues are also a consideration to be taken into account.40 These are all 
elements that in their combination lead to a situation of extreme vulnerability.  
                                                          
34 See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J. 
L. & FEMINISM 1, 17 (2008) (affirming that “[v]ulnerability is universal and, as such, transcends historic 
categories of impermissible discrimination”). 
35 Fineman, supra note 13 at 268-9. 
36 See TURNER, supra note 10 at 25 (about the dependency upon institutions and their precariousness).  
37 See for instance, Rahimi v. Greece, supra note 20, ¶ 87; Popov v. France, supra note 20, ¶ 91; Mubilanzila 
Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, supra note 20, ¶ 103. 
38 See Exploring child migrant vulnerabilities and those of children left-behind, International Labour Organization (ILO) 
(Oct. 1, 2010), available at http://www.ilo.org/ipecinfo/product/viewProduct.do?productId=14313 at 9 
(Arguing that girls are especially susceptible to sexual abuse during the migratory process). 
39 See Reilly, Disabilities among refugees and conflict-affected populations, 35 FORCED MIGRATION REVIEW 8 (2010). 
40 The ECtHR takes into account the stress and anxiety that detention causes in migrant children which may 
be considered as inhuman or degrading treatment under article 3 ECHR. See, e.g., Mubilanzila Mayeka and 
Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, supra note 20, ¶ 58; Tarakhel v. Switzerland, supra note 20, ¶ 99; see also Mina 
Fazel et. al., Mental Health of Displaced and Refugee Children Resettled in High-Income Countries: Risk and Protective 
Factors, 379 LANCET 266, 279 (2012) (explaining that “evidence lends support to the idea of spirals of loss 
drawing attention to the way many challenges affect refugees at all stages of their journeys”). 
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Accordingly, it is submitted that we can speak of a composite form of vulnerability41 
whenever two or more of these elements are present at the same time.42 However, 
composite vulnerability should not be understood as cumulative in nature. In other words, 
it should emphatically not be misused and misunderstood as a simple tick-box exercise, 
with individuals who do not meet the requisite number of criteria being excluded from 
protection.43 On the contrary, composite vulnerability should allow for a particularised 
view of migrant children’s concrete situations.  
In comparison, although the IACtHR strongly relates to identifiable groups of 
individuals, it also takes into account their particular situation within the group, and the 
relationship with individuals and institutions outside the group. For instance, in the case 
of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v Paraguay,44 the IACtHR recognised the 
vulnerability of certain indigenous communities, notably when its members were not 
legally registered in State’s official records.45 However, it is interesting to note that the 
IACtHR emphasised the existence of especially vulnerable groups within this indigenous 
community while assessing “the actual risk and vulnerability situation to which the 
members of the Sawhoyamaxa Community are exposed, especially children, pregnant 
women and the elderly”.46 It follows that in that case, certain categories of people were 
deemed to experience an additional aspect of vulnerability, as they not only belonged to 
the indigenous community and were therefore socially and economically excluded, but 
they were also children, pregnant women, or elderly.  
                                                          
41 The term compounded vulnerability has also been used by scholars in a broader context relating to other 
groups of people and not only migrant children. See Alexandra Timmer, A Quiet Revolution: Vulnerability in the 
European Court of Human, in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW 
AND POLITICS 147, 161 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Ana Grear eds., 2013); Ulrik Brandl & Philip Czech, 
General and Specific Vulnerability of Protection-Seekers in the EU: Is there an Adequate Response to their Needs?, in 
PROTECTING VULNERABLE GROUPS. THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK 247, 251 (Francesca 
Ippolito & Sara Iglesias Sanchez eds., 2015). 
42 For the purposes of comparison, it is interesting to note that the Human Rights Committee has also 
recognised the “special vulnerability of certain categories of person, including in particular children” which 
should be taken into account by States while ensuring that individuals have accessible and effective remedies: 
see Human Rights Comm., General Comment No 31: The nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States Parties 
to the Covenant, ¶ 15, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (May 12, 2004). 
43 See notably Aoife O’Higgins, Vulnerability and Agency: Beyond an Irreconcilable Dichotomy for Social Service Providers 
Working with Young Refugees in the UK, in INDEPENDENT CHILD MIGRATION – INSIGHTS INTO AGENCY, 
VULNERABILITY, AND STRUCTURE 79, 85 (Aida Orgocka & Christina Clark-Kazak eds., 2012) (finding that 
“where young people did not conform to expectations of vulnerability deemed appropriate for a refugee 
child, they risked being denied the support they needed”). 
44 Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, INTER-AM. 
CT. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146 (Mar. 29, 2006). 
45 Id., at ¶¶ 189-91.  
46 Id., at ¶ 159. 
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Furthermore, in the case of the Girls Yean and Bosico v Dominican Republic,47 the IACtHR 
specifically considered that “the State must pay special attention to the needs and the rights 
of the alleged victims owing to their condition as girl children, who belong to a vulnerable 
group”.48 The composite nature of the victims’ vulnerability is apparent in this case, as 
they were not only children but also girls, and were discriminated in relation to their origins 
(Dominicans of Haitian descent). In its Advisory Opinion OC-21, the IACtHR 
emphasised the “situation of additional vulnerability”49  in which migrant children often 
find themselves, entailing an “increased risk of violation of their rights.”50   
Therefore, any finding of group vulnerability must be complemented by a close 
contextual analysis of the situation of the individuals vis-à-vis their place in the different 
social groups. The next section examines how regional human rights courts have 
undertaken this type of analysis in their jurisprudence. 
B. Contextual Analysis 
Despite maintaining a group dimension for its understanding of the concept of 
vulnerability, the ECtHR takes into account the particular aspects of the situation of 
individual migrant children. In doing so, it thus undertakes a contextual analysis of their 
cases.51 In this regard, a helpful general analytical framework has been proposed by Peroni 
and Timmer.52 They suggest that the concept of vulnerability as exposed by the ECtHR is 
“relational, particular and harm-based.”53 This framework can serve as a basis for verifying 
how vulnerability is applied to the specific context of the protection of migrant children’s 
rights in three main ways.  
Firstly, Peroni and Timmer contend that vulnerability can be seen as relational insofar 
as it is “shaped by social, historical, and institutional forces”.54 The individual is therefore 
placed in a context, the one of relationships within his or her group.  In the case of migrant 
children’s vulnerability, this aspect can be seen in the treatment of the vulnerability of the 
                                                          
47 Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, INTER-AM. CT. H.R. (ser. C) No. 130 (Sept. 8, 2005) (relating to the denial of nationality to 
Dominicans of Haitian descent by the Dominican authorities). 
48 Id., at ¶ 134. 
49 Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, supra note 21, ¶ 71. 
50 Id. 
51 This is the case in all decisions involving migrant children in which the ECtHR explicitly referred to the 
concept of vulnerability. See Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, supra note 20, ¶ 103; 
Muskhadzhiyeva and others v. Belgium, supra note 8, ¶ 63; Popov v. France, supra note 20, ¶ 102; Tarahkel 
v. Switzerland, supra note 20, ¶¶ 116-22; Rahimi v. Greece, supra note 20, ¶ 87; Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys 
Abubakar v. Malta, supra note 20, ¶ 113; Kanagaratnam and others v. Belgium, supra note 20, ¶¶ 64-8. 
52 See Peroni & Timmer, supra note 19. 
53 Id., at 1064.  
54 Id.. 
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child as an axiom by the ECtHR.55 Children are considered as automatically vulnerable in 
their relationship with adults. The same type of approach has been taken by the IACtHR.56 
This is also the perception of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (“the 
Committee”).57 Therefore, the ECtHR, the IACtHR, and the Committee all acknowledge 
that children are per se more vulnerable to the effects of the abuses of their rights than 
adults.58  
However, it is submitted that this position should be nuanced, as children do not 
constitute a homogeneous group. Research demonstrates that children’s cognitive 
development evolves with age and so does their capacity to adapt and to become more 
resilient to external factors.59 Moreover, if taken out of context, this aspect of the 
                                                          
55 See Popov v. France, supra note 20, ¶ 91 (affirming that “it is important to bear in mind that the child’s 
extreme vulnerability is the decisive factor and takes precedence over considerations relating to the status of 
illegal immigrant”). 
56 See Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v Paraguay, supra note 44, ¶ 159 (indicating the risks incurred 
by certain categories of indigenous populations, and in particular their children). 
57 See Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 6, supra note 6, ¶ 4 (arguing that these 
children are particularly vulnerable); Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 8: The Right 
of the Child to Protection from Corporal Punishment and Other Cruel or Degrading Forms of Punishment (arts. 19; 28, para. 
2; and 37, inter alia), ¶ 21, CRC/C/GC/8 (May 15, 2006) (emphasising the vulnerability of children in general); 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 14: The Right of the Child to Have His or Her Best 
Interests Taken as a Primary Consideration (art. 3, para. 1), ¶ 54, CRC/C/GC/14 (Jan. 14, 2013) (stressing that 
“[t]he fact that the child is very young or in a vulnerable situation (e.g. has a disability, belongs to a minority 
group, is a migrant, etc.) does not deprive him or her of the right to express his or her views, nor reduces 
the weight given to the child’s views in determining his or her best interests”); Committee on the Rights of 
the Child, General Comment No 15: The Right of the Child to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Health 
(art. 24), ¶ 8, CRC/C/GC/15 (Jan. 14, 2013) (arguing that discrimination a significant factor contributing to 
children’s vulnerability); Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 16: State Obligations 
Regarding the Impact of the Business Sector on Children’s Rights, ¶ 31, CRC/C/GC/16 (Jan. 14, 2013) (emphasising 
that “children can be more vulnerable to the effects of abuse of their rights than adults and that the effects 
can be irreversible and result in lifelong damage”); Committee on the Rights of the Child, Draft General 
Comment on the Implementation of the Rights of the Child During Adolescence, ¶ 2, CRC/C/GC/20 (Apr. 22, 2016) 
(emphasising the significant vulnerability of children at that period of their lives). See also Kristen Sandberg, 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Vulnerability of Children, 84 NORDIC JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 221, 222 (2015) (explaining that “using society’s institutions to build resilience is one 
of the main ideas of the vulnerability theory, which should not lead to paternalism but rather might add to 
the understanding and application of the Convention, with the potential to strengthen its implementation”). 
58 See Joyce Koo Dalrymple, Seeking Asylum Alone: Using the Best Interests of the Child Principle to Protect 
Unaccompanied Minors, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 131, 139 (2006) (arguing that taking into account the 
unique situation of vulnerability of unaccompanied minors, “by not distinguishing unaccompanied minors 
from adults, the law gives no consideration to children’s unique difficulties in satisfying the same legal 
standards”); John Tobin, Understanding Children’s Rights: A Vision beyond Vulnerability, 84 NORDIC J INT'L L. 
155, 166  (2015) (arguing that children have “special vulnerabilities, which accord with the lived experiences 
of children, provide a basis for the special rights which children enjoy under the CRC”). 
59 See Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Development during Childhood Through Early 
Adulthood, 101 PROC NATL ACAD SCI U S A 8174, 8178 (2004)  (finding that children’s brains develop in a 
specific pattern and growth has a consequence for behaviour and neurodevelopmental disorders); Rachel 
Keen, The Development of Problem Solving in Young Children: A Critical Cognitive Skill, 62 ANNU REV PSYCHOL. 1, 
7 (2011) (discussing children’s skills according to their age and stage of cognitive development);  Mina Fazel 
& Alan Stein, The mental health of refugee children, 87 ARCH. DIS. CHILD. 366, 367 (2002) (affirming that 
“traumatic events can have an effect on a child’s emotional, cognitive, and moral development because they 
influence the child’s self-perceptions and expectations of others”). 
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recognition of vulnerability can be highly problematic. It may indeed reinforce the 
assumption that all children are not fully capable beings and excessively emphasise their 
dependency on adults. In this regard, recognition of vulnerability should not exclude 
agency.60 In addition, migrant children’s vulnerability also relates to other aspects such as 
their condition as migrants, gender, disability, and mental health. Accordingly, all these 
elements should be taken into consideration when migrant children are concerned. 
Secondly, the concept of vulnerability is arguably particular, insofar as the “vulnerability 
is shaped by specific group-based experiences”.61 The ECtHR takes into account the 
particular experiences that migrant children may have had within their vulnerable group. 
A case in point is Popov v France, which concerned the detention of a couple from 
Kazakhstan who were facing deportation with their two children aged five months and 
three years, respectively.62 The ECtHR affirmed that the migrant children concerned had 
been in a situation of particular vulnerability, heightened by the conditions of detention.63  
Likewise, in Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v Malta, the ECtHR held that the 
applicants who were aged sixteen and seventeen years old “were particularly vulnerable 
because of everything they had been through during their migration and the traumatic 
experiences they were likely to have endured previously.”64 Furthermore, it admitted that 
they “were even more vulnerable than any other adult asylum seeker detained at the time 
because of their age.”65 By doing so, the ECtHR maintains its axiomatic view that children 
are per se more vulnerable than adults but also takes into consideration the risks related to 
the migratory context.66 Accordingly, this approach allows for a more in concreto analysis of 
the situation of the migrant children which can outweigh the negative effects of the use of 
the concept of vulnerability.  
Thirdly, it is posited that the concept can be seen as harm-based. The ECtHR situates 
harm—including physical, mental and sexual abuse, social disadvantage and material 
deprivation—at the centre of its understanding of vulnerability.67 Harm is therefore 
assessed in light of the relevant context and potential external risk. For instance, in relation 
                                                          
60 Agency is defined by O’Higgins as “young people’s ability to participate meaningfully in the construction 
of their daily lives, including their capacity to cope, their ability to adapt, and their resilience”: O’Higgins, 
supra note 43, at 81. 
61 Peroni & Timmer, supra note 19, at 1064. Material deprivation of unaccompanied children has also been 
considered by the ECtHR (Rahimi v. Greece, supra note 20, ¶ 87). 
62 Popov v. France, supra note 20. 
63 Id., at ¶ 102. 
64 Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v. Malta, supra note 20, ¶ 113.  
65 Id. 
66 Conversely, in its decision Mahamed Jama v. Malta the ECtHR considered that the applicant who was 
found to be an adult following age determination proceedings “was not more vulnerable than any other 
adult asylum seeker detained at the time” even though she “was particularly vulnerable because of everything 
she had been through during her migration and the traumatic experiences she was likely to have endured 
previously”: Mahamed Jama v. Malta, supra note 29, ¶ 100. 
67 Peroni &Timmer, supra note 19, at 1064. 
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to the situation of migrant children, the external risk of harm appears to be at the heart of 
the development of ECtHR’s jurisprudence.  
Accordingly, in Musknadzhiyeva and others v Belgium, the ECtHR concluded that the 
detention of four children aged respectively seven months, three years and a half, five 
years, and seven years in a closed detention centre primarily designed for adults was 
unlawful, despite the fact that they were not separated from their mother.68 The conditions 
of their detention were deemed detrimental for their mental health.69 Likewise, in V.M. 
and others v Belgium, the ECtHR took into account the possibility of harm due to the 
situation of vulnerability of the applicants, a family of Roma origin with five children 
(including a baby and a handicapped child).70 The ECtHR found a violation of article 3 
ECHR (prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment) in relation to the 
deplorable conditions in which they were forced to live between their removal from the 
detention centre and their expulsion to Serbia.71 Similarly, in Tarakhel v Switzerland, the 
ECtHR emphasised the lack of sufficient assurances that, if returned to Italy, the 
applicants’ family, which included six minor children, would be taken care of in a manner 
adapted to the age of the children.72  
The IACtHR has adopted a similar approach in its advisory opinion OC-21.73 It clearly 
emphasised the risks of harm to which migrant children are exposed while migrating and 
directly referred to General Comment No. 6 of the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child.74 In particular, these risks relate to threats to their life, freedom, security or personal 
integrity.75 The contextual analysis of their situation allows for a better understanding of 
their harm-based vulnerability.  
Academic scholarship has drawn attention to the potential dangers posed by the 
concept of vulnerability.76 If not assessed adequately, it can give way to adverse outcomes. 
On the one hand, it can lead to the stigmatisation of the already vulnerable groups.77  On 
the other hand, it may lead to the over-generalisation of the topic, one that presumes all 
members of a group are equally vulnerable. However, in the specific context of the 
protection of migrant children’s rights, judicial recognition of their vulnerability can 
                                                          
68 Muskhadzhiyeva and others v. Belgium, supra note 8, ¶¶ 59-63. 
69 Id. 
70 V.M. and others v. Belgium, App. No. 60125/11 (EUR. CT. H.R., July 7, 2015).  
71 Id. ¶ 138. 
72 Tarakhel v. Switzerland, supra note 20, ¶ 121. 
73 Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, supra note 21, ¶ 90 (particularly referring to risks of harm incurred by 
unaccompanied or separated migrant children). 
74 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General comment No 6, supra note 6, ¶ 23 (outlining the risks of 
harm that migrant children incur while on the move). 
75 Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, supra note 21, ¶ 90. 
76 See supra note 19 
77 See Peroni & Timmer, supra note 19, at 1070 (arguing that the ECtHR’s reasoning in relation to the concept 
of vulnerability “risks reinforcing the vulnerability of certain groups by essentializing, stigmatizing, and 
paternalizing them”). 
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arguably lead to improved consideration of their specific needs. By identifying the 
particularities of these children’s situation, courts can avoid the stigmatising them as a 
vulnerable group. In addition, if their vulnerabilities relate to a particular situation and are 
not seen as inherent to their condition of children, harm can be more easily prevented. 
For instance, physical and psychological harm can be avoided if States agree that 
unaccompanied minors and families with children should not be placed in detention 
facilities that are not adapted to receive them.  
Accordingly, if regional human right courts are able to take into account the 
particularities of the situation of migrant children,78 it is possible to argue that the use of 
the concept of vulnerability can have a positive impact for the protection of their 
fundamental rights. The ECtHR takes into account the different elements relating to the 
migrant children’s personal history and state of physical and mental health, the 
environment in which they develop, and the risk of abuses while on the move and once 
in the country of destination.79 By doing so, it imposes a multi-layered analysis of the 
vulnerability according to these different elements. However, these layers should not be 
understood as cumulative. Composite vulnerability should not be misused and 
transformed into an exclusion tool.  
On the contrary, composite vulnerability should be used as a tool to include a wider 
range of migrant children into protection and to inform better decision-making. By 
situating the vulnerability into the specific context of migrant children’s experiences, the 
ECtHR is directing its jurisprudence towards a more inclusive framework of protection of 
migrant children’s rights. This is highly encouraging,80 especially given that the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence can have persuasive authority and lead into a form of judicial dialogue with 
domestic courts.81 For instance, it is interesting to note the recent UK Upper Tribunal’s 
                                                          
78 See Wouter Vandenhole & Julie Ryngaert, Mainstreaming Children’s Rights in Migration Litigation: 
Muskhadzhiyeva and others v Belgium, in DIVERSITY AND EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS: REWRITING 
JUDGEMENTS OF THE ECHR 68, 72 (Eva Brems ed., 2013) (arguing that three factors determine vulnerability 
– personal, environmental and risk - and that the degree of vulnerability and agency depends on the 
interaction between these different factors). 
79 See notably Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, supra note 20; Muskhadzhiyeva and others 
v. Belgium, supra note 8; Popov v. France, supra note 20; Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v. Malta, supra 
note 20. 
80 But see Marc Bossuyt, Is the European Court of Human Rights on a Slippery Slope?, in THE EUROPEAN COURT 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND ITS DISCONTENTS. TUNING CRITICISM INTO STRENGTH 27, 30 (Spyridon Flogaitis, 
Tom Zwart & Julie Fraser eds., 2013) (expressing strong criticism about the ECtHR’s jurisprudence 
recognising the vulnerability of asylum seekers). 
81 See McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 
20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 499, 515 (2000) (for a critical evaluation of meaning and significance of the 
citation of judgements from other jurisdictions by domestic courts in the field of the protection of 
constitutional rights); MICHAL BOBEK, COMPARATIVE REASONING IN EUROPEAN SUPREME COURTS (2013) 
(analysing cross-border judicial dialogue in Europe); Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Judicial Dialogue as a Means of 
Interpretation, in THE INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY DOMESTIC COURTS: UNIFORMITY, 
DIVERSITY, CONVERGENCE 72, 72 (Helmut Philipp Aust & Georg Nolte eds., 2016) (arguing that 
international law requires domestic jurisdictions to engage in a sort of judicial dialogue by considering 
decisions of other jurisdictions); Frédéric Sudre, À propos du ‘dialogue des juges’ et du contrôle de conventionnalité, in 
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decision ordering the family reunification of three Syrian minors and one Syrian mentally 
disabled adult who were living in an improvised refugee camp (also known as “the jungle”) 
in Calais, France.82 The resemblance with the general line of ECtHR’s jurisprudence 
related to composite vulnerability of migrant children is remarkable. The UK Upper 
Tribunal’s decision emphasised the applicants’ “special, indeed unique, situation because 
of their ages, their vulnerability, their psychologically traumatised condition, the acute and 
ever present dangers to which they are exposed in ‘the jungle’, [and] the mental disability 
of [one of the applicants].”83 Based on their vulnerability and considerations of the best 
interests of the children, the judges decided that to refuse the admission of the applicants 
to the UK would disproportionately interfere with their right to respect for family life 
under article 8 ECHR.84 The Upper Tribunal thus took into account the specific situation 
of the applicants while expressly acknowledging their group vulnerability. Although this 
decision was later overturned on appeal,85 the Court of Appeal similarly recognised the 
importance of the vulnerability inherent in the situation of unaccompanied migrant 
children.86   
Overall, the official acknowledgment of the composite vulnerability of migrant children 
contributes to the promotion of awareness about the necessity to protect their rights 
adequately. Specific consideration of the principle of best interest of the child can further 
reinforce the necessity of protection, as will be shown in the next section. 
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VULNERABILITY AND BEST INTEREST OF 
THE CHILD 
A. Complementarity 
According to article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the best 
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration in all actions concerning children.87 
                                                          
LES DYNAMIQUES DU DROIT EUROPÉEN EN DÉBUT DE SIÈCLE : ÉTUDES EN L'HONNEUR DE JEAN-CLAUDE 
GAUTRON 207, 210  (Joël Andriantsimbazovina et al., eds., 2004) (discussing the existence of a judicial 
dialogue in relation to the application of the ECHR by domestic courts).  
82 The Queen on the application of ZAT, IAJ, KAM, AAM, MAT, MAJ and LAM v. Secretary of State for 
the Home Department [2015] 6 JR 15405. 
83 Id., at ¶ 6. 
84 Id., at ¶ 58. 
85  Secretary of State for the Home Department v. ZAT & Ors (Syria) [2016] WLR (D) 452; [2016] EWCA 
Civ 810. 
86  Id., at ¶ 84 (per Lord Justice Beatson) (affirming that “the need for expedition in cases involving 
particularly vulnerable persons such as unaccompanied children is recognised … Delay to family 
reunification may in itself be an interference with rights under ECHR Article 8”). 
87 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 5, art. 3. The best interest principle is also provided by 
article 24(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. The Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) considers the CRC when applying general principles of EU law. See Case C-540/03 European 
Parliament v Council, 2006 E.C.R. I-05769, ¶ 37. 
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This principle provides a normative framework for the definition and interpretation of the 
rights of the child.88 The ECtHR tends to combine the concept of vulnerability with the 
principle of the best interests of the child while deciding on issues relating to the protection 
of migrant children’s rights. The principle of best interests of the child can indeed be a 
valuable complement to the concept of vulnerability.  
It is commonly accepted that it is in the child’s best interest, for instance, to acquire a 
nationality and have her birth registered,89 receive adequate education,90 have her 
application for family reunification dealt with by States “in a positive, human and 
expeditious manner”,91 not be arbitrarily separated from her parents or carers,92 or to 
receive adequate protection against all forms of physical and mental violence or abuse.93 
These considerations also apply to unaccompanied or separated migrant children,94 
including in relation to conditions of reception, treatment and access to basic rights in 
countries of transit and destination.95 The best interest of the child principle creates 
therefore an additional layer of protection, complementing the general protection offered 
by regional human rights treaties.96 
By way of an illustrative example, in Rahimi v Greece, the ECtHR acknowledged the 
situation of extreme vulnerability of the applicant, an unaccompanied migrant boy from 
Afghanistan who was detained for two days upon arrival in Greece and subsequently 
abandoned to live on the streets.97 The Court found a violation of article 3 ECHR in 
relation to the deplorable conditions of his detention and the lack of care by public 
                                                          
88 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 14, supra note 57, ¶ 6 (recognising that the 
child’s best interests is a threefold concept: a substantive right, an interpretative legal principle, and a rule of 
procedure). 
89 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 5, art. 7. 
90 Id. art. 28. 
91 Id. art. 10. 
92 Id. art. 9. 
93 Id. arts. 19, 32, 34-6. 
94 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 6, supra note 6, ¶¶ 7-8.  
95 See Guidelines on Formal Determination of the Best Interests of the Child, UNHCR (May 2008), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/4566b16b2.pdf, at 14 (defining the term best interest as broadly describing the well-
being of a child); Inter-agency Guiding Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children, UNHCR (Jan. 2004), 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/4098b3172.html, at 16 (considering the principle of best interest of the 
child as “the basic standard for guiding decisions and actions taken to help children, whether by national or 
international organizations, courts of law, administrative authorities, or legislative bodies”). 
96 See JANE MCADAM, COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW 173 (2006) 
(affirming that the consideration of best interests of the child constitute a complementary ground of 
protection vis-à-vis the Refugee Convention); Jason M. Pobjoy, The Best Interests of the Child Principle as an 
Independent Source of International Protection 64 ICLQ 327, 344 (2015) (arguing that the best interest principle 
may give rise to an independent protection status in international law); see also, in the context of deportation 
of foreigners, Üner v. The Netherlands App. No. 46410/99, ¶ 58 (EUR. CT. H.R., Oct. 18, 2006) (affirming 
that consideration should be given to “the best interests and well-being of the children, in particular the 
seriousness of the difficulties which any children of the applicant are likely to encounter in the country to 
which the applicant is to be expelled”). 
97 Rahimi v. Greece, supra note 20, ¶¶ 86-7. 
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authorities, notably in light of his vulnerability.98 However, the Court’s finding of violation 
of article 5(1) ECHR99 was particularly based on the Greek authorities’ absence of 
consideration of the best interest of the child applicant.100 Taking into account the 
vulnerability of the applicant, the ECtHR indicated that the Greek authorities could not 
be deemed to have acted in good faith101 as they did not consider the child’s best interests 
while deciding on his detention.102 In Kanagaratnam and others v Belgium,103 a decision relating 
to the conditions of detention of a mother and three children of Sri Lankan Tamil origins 
who had claimed asylum in Belgium, the ECtHR recognised the vulnerability of the 
children and also emphasised the importance of the best interest of the child principle.104 
It is submitted that by referring and drawing upon both the concept of vulnerability and 
the principle of best interest of the child the ECtHR advances the complementarity of the 
two notions.  
This approach is certainly not without its flaws, and several of these deficiencies ought 
to be highlighted. Firstly, the ECtHR did not go as far as imposing a ban on detention of 
migrant children,105 whereas evidence demonstrates its negative effects for their long-term 
psychological health.106 Secondly, in Rahimi, the ECtHR has imported the principle of best 
interest of the child from the realm of the CRC, but did not provide a comprehensive 
definition of its scope or the specific obligations required from States.107 Finally, although 
                                                          
98 Id., at ¶ 95. 
99 See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 
213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Dec. 3, 1953) (hereinafter “ECHR”), art. 5(1)(f) (“Everyone has the 
right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and 
in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: … f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent 
his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with 
a view to deportation or extradition.”). 
100 Rahimi v. Greece, supra note 20, ¶ 109.  
101 The ECtHR has established that detention of a foreigner is not arbitrary only insofar as it meets the four 
conditions established in Saadi v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 13229/03, ¶ 74 (Jan. 29, 2008) (“[t]o avoid 
being branded as arbitrary, therefore, such detention must be carried out in good faith; it must be closely 
connected to the purpose of preventing unauthorised entry of the person to the country; the place and 
conditions of detention should be appropriate, bearing in mind that ‘the measure is applicable not to those 
who have committed criminal offences but to aliens who, often fearing for their lives, have fled from their 
own country’; and the length of the detention should not exceed that reasonably required for the purpose 
pursued”). The same conditions also apply for detention for the purpose of removal (Id., at ¶ 73).  
102 Rahimi v. Greece, supra note 20, ¶ 109. 
103 Kanagaratnam and others v. Belgium, supra note 20. 
104 Id., at ¶ 67. 
105 See DEMBOUR, supra note 8 at 394 (affirming that “a blanket condemnation of children’s detention when 
the said children are not ‘unaccompanied’ is conspicuous by its absence”).  
106 See Michael Dudley et al., Children and Young People in Immigration Detention, 25 CURR OPIN PSYCHIATRY 
285 (2012); MARY BOSWORTH, INSIDE IMMIGRATION DETENTION (2014) at 199; Aamer Sultan & Kevin 
O’Sullivan, Psychological disturbances in asylum seekers held in long term detention: a participant-observer account, 175 
MED J AUST 593 (2001); Ann Lorek et al., The mental and physical health difficulties of children held within a British 
immigration detention center: A pilot study, 33 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 573 (2009); Louise Newman & Zachary 
Steel, The Child Asylum Seeker: Psychological and Developmental Impact of Immigration Detention, 17 CHILD ADOLESC. 
PSYCHIATR. CLIN. N. AM. 665 (2008).  
107 Rahimi v. Greece, supra note 20, ¶ 33. 
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it expressly cited article 3 CRC in the abovementioned decisions,108 the ECtHR failed to 
refer to the Committee on the Rights of the Child’s General Comment No. 6, which 
specifically relates to the treatment of unaccompanied and separated children outside their 
country of origin.109 In doing so, the ECtHR has overlooked the definition of the 
determination of best interest adopted by the Committee,110 possibly in an attempt to avoid 
being bound by the Committee’s stronger child-centred views on detention of migrant 
children.111 This dissociation from the Committee on the Rights of the Child’s position on 
detention is confirmed by the ECtHR’s ruling in Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v 
Malta.112 In this decision, the ECtHR did finally explicitly refer to the General Comment 
No. 6,113 but it did not in fact use the principle of best interests in its assessment of the 
lawfulness and non-arbitrariness of the detention of the applicants.114 By contrast, the 
IACtHR’s approach is closer to the one adopted by the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child in its General Comment No. 6 regarding detention and the best interests of the 
child. This can be seen in the fact that, in addition to citing the General Comment in its 
Advisory Opinion No. 21, the IACtHR has also directly drawn upon it.115 
In relation to article 8 ECHR (right to respect for private and family life), the ECtHR’s 
recourse to the concept of vulnerability is comparatively less well developed than the one 
in the field of articles 3 and 5 ECHR. In contrast, the references to the child’s best interests 
are quite significant.116 For example, the ECtHR takes into account several factors, 
including age, rupture of family life, ties to the host country, immigration control and 
considerations of public order to determine whether it is in the child’s best interests not 
to be removed.117 Accordingly, achieving a fair balance between competing interests of 
                                                          
108 Id., at ¶ 108; Kanagaratnam and others v. Belgium, supra note 20, ¶ 67. 
109 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 6, supra note 6. 
110 Id., at ¶ 20 (affirming that “a determination of what is in the best interests of the child requires a clear 
and comprehensive assessment of the child’s identity, including her or his nationality, upbringing, ethnic, 
cultural and linguistic background, particular vulnerabilities and protection needs. Consequently, allowing 
the child access to the territory is a prerequisite to this initial assessment process. The assessment process 
should be carried out in a friendly and safe atmosphere by qualified professionals who are trained in age and 
gender sensitive related interviewing techniques”). 
111 Id. ¶ 61 (affirming that “detention cannot be justified solely on the basis of the child being unaccompanied 
or separated, or on their migratory or residence status, or lack thereof”).  
112 Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v. Malta, supra note 20. 
113 Id., at ¶ 56. 
114 Id., at ¶¶ 139-48. The applicants were detained for eight months after having claimed asylum while their 
age was determined by the competent authorities. The ECtHR found that there was a violation of article 
5(1) ECHR after considering the four conditions established in Saadi v. the United Kingdom, supra note 
101. However, it did not explicitly consider the best interests of the child while assessing the authorities’ 
good faith and the length of detention imposed on the applicants.    
115 See Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, supra note 21, ¶ 155. 
116 See Nunez v. Norway, App. No. 55597/09, ¶¶ 78-84 (June 28, 2011) (analysing the considerations relating 
to the children’s best interest regarding the fair balance test under article 8 ECHR). 
117 See Id., at ¶ 70; Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer v. The Netherlands, App. No. 50435/99, ¶ 39 (Jan. 
31, 2006); Ajayi and Others v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 27663/95, ¶ 2 (June 22, 1999); Solomon v. 
The Netherlands, App. No. 44328/98, ¶ 1 (Sept. 5, 2000). 
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States and individuals is at the centre of its jurisprudence.118 On the one hand, States have 
the right to control the entry of non-nationals into their territories and family reunion is 
not automatically guaranteed under article 8 ECHR.119 On the other hand, the particular 
circumstances of the case and the child’s best interests have been taken into account by 
the Court.120 Still, these particular circumstances could and should also include the migrant 
children’s vulnerability. The ECtHR should expressly build this notion into its evaluation 
of the specific circumstances of each case involving migrant children.  
Comparatively, the IACtHR proposes a clearer double-layered test to determine the 
nature and scope of special measures for the protection of migrant children required from 
States. Firstly, it requires the domestic authorities to evaluate different factors that may 
result in the recognition of vulnerability. Secondly, it expects these authorities to analyse 
whether these measures were taken in the best interests of the children.121 The sole test of 
best interests would not suffice to determine the nature and the extent of the measures 
necessary for the protection of the migrant children. For instance, the IACtHR suggested 
that unaccompanied or separated migrant girls are particularly vulnerable due to higher 
risks of sexual exploitation and abuses.122 In this sense, domestic authorities should first 
take into account their particular situation of vulnerability and then consider what would 
be in their best interests in order to adopt the most appropriated measures.123  
Drawing upon the abovementioned examples, it appears that the ECtHR tends to rely 
upon the concept of vulnerability to emphasise the need for special measures of protection 
of migrant children. This is particularly prominent in the context of articles 3 and 5 ECHR. 
In addition, the principle of best interests of the child complements and reinforces the 
request for special measures, notably in the ambit of article 3 ECHR. By referring to the 
principle of best interests of the child, the ECtHR locates these special measures within a 
broader regulatory framework, making it easier to determine whether a substantive right 
has been violated or not by domestic authorities. In contrast, the IACtHR, embraces a 
more comprehensive child rights-based approach emphasising considerations of welfare 
of migrant children.   
It is submitted that the complementary use of the concept of vulnerability and the 
principle of best interests of the child should be welcomed as it can pave the way towards 
                                                          
118 See Nunez v. Norway supra note 116, ¶¶ 78-84. See also Ciara Smyth, The Best Interests of the Child in the 
Expulsion and First-Entry Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: How Principled is the Court’s Use of the 
Principle?, 17 EUR J MIGR LAW 70, 103 (2015) (affirming that “the Court does not generally ground its 
reasoning in a rights-based approach”). 
119 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, App. No.s 9214/80, 9473/81, 9474/81, ¶ 67 
(May 28, 1985). 
120 See Nunez v. Norway, supra note 116, ¶ 70; Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer v. The Netherlands, supra 
note 117, ¶ 39. 
121 Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, supra note 21 ¶ 103. 
122 Id., at ¶ 102. 
123 Id., at ¶ 103. 
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a more robust and effective implementation of special measures of protection and 
assistance for migrant children.124 The assessment of the vulnerability of the situation of 
these children coupled with the consideration of their best interests as a guiding principle 
could require, for instance, that States provide more adequate assistance to 
unaccompanied migrant children while in makeshift camps,125 or while placed in offshore 
detention facilities.126 However, this complementarity should not be undermined by the 
instrumentalization of the principle of best interests of the child, as will be exposed in the 
next section. 
B. Instrumentalization 
The analysis of the ECtHR jurisprudence demonstrates that the principle of best 
interests of the child can be a powerful tool in finding breaches of protected rights. For 
instance, this was the approach adopted by the ECtHR in Rahimi v Greece.127 It was the 
procedural flaw in the appreciation of the best interest of the child by the Greek authorities 
that reinforced the finding of violation of article 5(1) ECHR in this decision, not the sole 
fact of detention of a vulnerable migrant child.128 Conversely, in Kanagaratnam and others v 
Belgium,129 a decision relating to the detention in a closed detention centre of a mother and 
three children of Sri Lankan Tamil origins who had claimed asylum in Belgium, the ECtHR 
found a breach of article 5(1) ECHR insofar as the children were concerned.130 The 
vulnerability of the children was paramount for the Court in reaching its verdict.131 
Without further developing its arguments, the ECtHR simply referred132 to a passage in 
its previous ruling in Mubilanzila Mayeke and Kaniki Mitunga v Belgium where the situation of 
extreme vulnerability of unaccompanied migrant children was explicitly acknowledged.133 
The ECtHR then applied the same findings to situations of detention of children, this time 
                                                          
124 See Jane McAdam, Seeking Asylum under the Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Case for Complementary 
Protection, 14 INT’L J. CHILDREN’S RTS 251, 251 (2006) (arguing that “the best interests of the child, reflecting 
an absolute principle of international law, are highly relevant in determining whether or not a child needs 
international protection”). 
125 See Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations regarding France, ¶ 75, CRC/C/FRA/CO/5 
(Jan. 29, 2016) (expressing concern about “the precarious situation of children and their families in refugee 
camps in the northern part of the State party, such as in Calais and in Grande-Synthe”).  
126 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations regarding Australia, ¶ 31, CRC/C/AUS/CO/4 
(May 29, 2012) (expressing concerns about the “inadequate understanding and application of the principle 
of the best interests of the child in asylum-seeking, refugee and/or immigration detention situations”).  
127 Rahimi v. Greece, supra note 20, ¶ 109. 
128 Id. 
129 Kanagaratnam and others v. Belgium, supra note 20103. 
130 Id., at ¶¶ 86-8. 
131 Id. 
132 Id., at ¶ 86. 
133 Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, supra note 20, ¶ 103. 
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accompanied by their parents, referring to its decision in Muskhadzhiyeva and others v 
Belgium,134 and finding a violation of article 5(1).135   
Conceivably, the principle of best interests of the child was less prominent in 
Kanagaratnam as in that case, the detention had lasted for approximately four months in a 
closed detention centre which had already been judged to be inappropriate for the needs 
of children.136 Taking into account their vulnerability, the Court considered that by placing 
the children (despite being accompanied by their mother) in such a closed centre, the 
Belgian authorities had exposed them to feelings of anxiety and inferiority and had, in full 
knowledge of the facts, risked compromising their development.137 The ECtHR could 
therefore find a violation of articles 3 and 5(1) ECHR without overly relying on the 
application of the principle of best interests of the child.138  The same approach was visible 
in Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v Malta where the detention of the applicants for the 
purpose of determining their age lasted for eight months.139 Despite explicitly referring to 
article 3 CRC140 and to the Committee on the Rights of the Child’s General Comment No. 
6,141 the ECtHR did not in fact make use of the principle of best interests of the child 
when finding violations of articles 3 and 5(1) ECHR.142 By contrast, in Rahimi the detention 
had lasted only for two days and the ECtHR relied heavily on the best interests principle 
in order to legitimate the overall finding of violation of article 5(1) ECHR.143  
Therefore, the principle of best interests appears to be instrumentalized by the ECtHR, 
which will use it only when convenient for finding of violations of the Convention. This 
approach, in addition to suffering from unnecessary pragmatism and inconsistency, is not 
without further risks. For instance, in a hypothetical situation similar to the one in 
Rahimi,144  if the State authorities proved that they had taken this principle into account in 
assessing the situation of a migrant child, the detention would not per se be contrary to the 
ECHR. In this case, the State would still need to satisfy the general test of detention as a 
measure of last resort, 145 but the principle of best interests would be satisfied. Despite 
                                                          
134 Muskhadzhiyeva and others v. Belgium, supra note 8, ¶ 61. 
135 See also Vandenhole & Ryngaert, supra note 77 at 68 (for a comprehensive commentary of this decision). 
136 Kanagaratnam and others v. Belgium, supra note 20, ¶¶ 37-9; Muskhadzhiyeva and others v. Belgium, 
supra note 8, ¶ 59-63 (affirming that this same detention centre was not an appropriate venue for detention 
of children). 
137 Kanagaratnam and others v. Belgium, supra note 20, ¶ 68. 
138 Id., at ¶¶ 68-9 (violation of art. 3 ECHR) and ¶¶ 86-8 (violation of art. 5(1) ECHR). 
139 Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v. Malta, supra note 20, ¶¶ 139-48. 
140 Id., at ¶ 41. 
141 Id., at ¶ 56. 
142 Id., at ¶¶ 113-5 and 146-8. 
143 Rahimi v. Greece, supra note 20, ¶¶ 107-8. 
144 Id. 
145 Popov v. France, supra note 20, ¶ 119 (establishing that detention should be seen as a measure of last 
resort for which no alternative is available). In this sense, the ECtHR’s approach is similar to the one of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) according to which immigration detention should be used 
as a last resort measure only. See Case C-61/11/PPU, Hassen El Dridi, alias Soufi Karim, 2011 E.C.R. I-
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these risks, the recognition of migrant children’s composite vulnerability, when combined 
with the assessment of their best interests, could pave the way towards the imposition of 
greater obligations of care and protection upon States, which is the subject of the following 
section. 
IV. TOWARDS THE IMPOSITION OF ENHANCED STATE OBLIGATIONS? 
A. ECtHR: Emphasis on Positive Obligations 
The recognition of vulnerability of migrant children and the use of the principle of best 
interests can be accompanied by the identification of an important duty owed by States to 
provide care and protection to these children.146 It is important to understand whether by 
doing so human rights courts are contributing to the creation of new categories of 
obligations to be imposed upon States. If this is not the case, it is crucial to investigate 
whether existing State obligations are being interpreted in an enhanced manner, and 
converted into a sort of super-obligations.  
The ECtHR puts forward a distinction between negative and positive obligations,147 
which overlaps to some degree with the tripartite distinction of obligations to respect, 
protect and fulfil human rights found in the academic literature.148 Negative obligations 
entail that States should refrain from interfering in the exercise of rights, whereas positive 
obligations mean that States should adopt all measures necessary to safeguard the effective 
respect of rights.149 
                                                          
3015, ¶ 34; Case C-329/11, Alexandre Achughbabian v. Prefet du Val-de-Marne, 2011 E.C.R. I-12695, ¶¶ 
36-7; Case C-601/15/PPU, J.N. v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, 2016, OJ C 38. See also Ana 
Beduschi, Detention of Undocumented Immigrants and the Judicial Impact of the CJEU’s Decisions in France, 26 INT’L 
J. REFUGEE L. 333 (2014) (evaluating the impact of the decisions El Dridi and Achughbabian vis-à-vis the 
requirement of use of detention as a last resort measure in the French legal system).  
146 See Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, supra note 20, ¶ 55. 
147 See ALASTAIR R. MOWBRAY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 141 (2004); Frédéric 
Sudre, Les obligations positives dans la jurisprudence européenne des droits de l’homme, RTDH 363 (1995). 
148 See Asbjørn Eide, The Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right, Report of the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Food, E/CN.4/ Sub.2/1987/23 (1987) (proposing a tripartite typology of State 
obligations in relation to respect, protection and fulfilment of human rights); HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: 
SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND US FOREIGN POLICY 52 (1980) (proposing the following typology of duties 
owed by States in relation to human rights: to avoid depriving individuals of rights, to protect individuals 
from deprivation, to aid the deprived); DE SCHUTTER, supra note 17 at 280 (for a detailed summary of the 
different typologies of State obligations in international human rights law); Rolf Künnemann, A Coherent 
Approach to Human Rights ,17  HUM. RIGHTS QUART. 323, 328 (1995) (arguing that States have the obligation 
to respect, protect and fulfil the existential status of human beings, or “how human beings are entitled to 
live in relation to the State under these human rights”); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
General Comment No 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11), ¶ 15, E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999). 
149 Airey v. Ireland, App. No. 6289/73, ¶ 32 (Oct. 9, 1979); Marckx v. Belgium, App. No. 6833/74, ¶ 31, 
(June 13, 1979); Jean-François Akandji-Kombe, Positive obligations under the European Convention on Human 
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Positive obligations applicable to situations involving migrant children are similar to 
those already in place regarding any individual falling within the jurisdiction of a State party 
to the ECHR.150 There are no new positive obligations created specifically in the context 
of the protection of migrant children’s rights. The same positive obligations are applicable 
to cases involving any other categories of individuals, and this is particularly apparent in 
relation to articles 3,151 5,152 and 8 ECHR.153  
An area of key interest relates to the application of article 3 ECHR to the situation of 
migrant children. For this provision to be applicable, ill-treatment must attain a minimum 
level of severity in order to fall within the scope of article 3 ECHR.154 Interestingly, in 
decisions relating to migrant children, the ECtHR tends to use the vulnerability concept 
to analyse the requirement of minimum level of severity.155 This approach has been 
criticised on the basis that it purportedly leads to the lowering of the threshold of 
                                                          
Rights. A guide to the implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights, 7 COUNCIL OF EUROPE HUMAN 
RIGHTS HANDBOOKS NO 7 (2007). 
150 See Vaughan Lowe & Christopher Staker, Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 335, 338 (Malcolm D. 
Evans ed., 2006); Bruno Simma &Andreas Th. Müller, Exercise and Limits of Jurisdiction, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 134, 135 (James Crawford & Martti Koskenniemi eds., 2012); Marko 
Milanovic, Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 132 (2012). 
151 Positive obligation to take all measures necessary to protect children from ill-treatment: see A. v. The 
United Kingdom, App. Nos. 100/1997/884/1096, ¶ 24 (Sept. 23, 1998) (finding that the UK domestic law 
failed to provide adequate protection to a child beaten by his stepfather when the beating constituted 
inhuman or degrading punishment and was known of the authorities); Z. and others v. The United Kingdom, 
App. No. 29392/95, ¶¶ 74-5 (May 10, 2001) (finding a violation of article 3 ECHR insofar as the State failed 
to take measures necessary to place vulnerable children into the Child Protection Register). Procedural 
positive obligation to investigate cases of ill-treatment: see E. and others v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 
33218/96, ¶ 100, (Nov. 26, 2002) (finding that local authorities failed to protect children from an abusive 
stepfather and emphasising the lack of investigation, communication and cooperation by the relevant 
authorities). 
152 See Kurt v. Turkey, App. No. 24276/94, ¶ 124, (May 25, 1998) (affirming that States have the obligation 
to record details about the detention as “[a]rticle 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective 
measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into 
an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen since”). 
153 See notably X. and Y. v. The Netherlands, App. No. 8978/80, ¶ 30 (Mar. 26, 1985) (finding a violation of 
article 8 ECHR insofar as the Dutch legislation imposed a procedural obstacle for the prosecution of the 
perpetrator of sexual assault against a 16 year old mentally-ill girl, who were unable to represent herself and 
who could not be represented by anyone else, including her parent, according to the Dutch legislation); 
Maire v. Portugal, App. No. 48206/99, ¶ 72 (June 26, 2003) (reaffirming that “the positive obligations that 
Article 8 of the Convention lays on the Contracting States in the matter of reuniting a parent with his or her 
children must be interpreted in the light of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects 
of International Child Abduction and the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989”); 
Hansen v. Turkey, App. No. 36141/97, ¶ 97, (Sept. 23, 2003) (emphasising that “the Court has repeatedly 
held that Article 8 includes a right for parents to have measures taken that will permit them to be reunited 
with their children and an obligation on the national authorities to take such action” also in the context of 
international abduction of children). 
154 See Ireland v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, ¶ 162, (January 18, 1978) (establishing that he 
assessment of this minimum level of severity is relative and “depends on all the circumstances of the case, 
such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state 
of health of the victim, etc.”); Tyrer v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, ¶ 29, (Apr. 25, 1978); 
Soering v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, ¶ 100, (July 7, 1989). 
155 Rahimi v. Greece, supra note 20, ¶ 86. 
 VULNERABILITY ON TRIAL 23 
application of article 3 ECHR, and does so in an inconsistent manner.156 On its face, the 
argument is appealing. However, it fails to convince for three main reasons.  
Firstly, as affirmed by the well-established ECtHR’s jurisprudence, all circumstances 
should be taken into account by the Court when deciding whether the level of severity of 
a treatment or punishment is of such relevance as to fall within the scope of article 3 
ECHR.157 The mention of “all circumstances” explicitly includes the potential victim’s 
age,158 and also should naturally include her particular situation of vulnerability.  
Secondly, it is clear that the assertion according to which all situations of vulnerability 
would automatically lead to the application of article 3 ECHR is erroneous. Fortunately, 
this is not the ECtHR’s position. Indeed, the ECtHR’s methodology relates rather to in 
concreto examination of all circumstances relating to the potential victim’s situation. In 
addition, it acknowledges the existence of composite vulnerability, recognising that several 
factors leading to vulnerability can exist at the same time and that it is precisely the 
confluence of these elements that gives rise to a specific form of vulnerability.159  
Thirdly, the argument that the ECtHR incorrectly emphasises the protection of social 
rights of specific categories of individuals160 cannot be accepted. Already in its seminal 
decision Airey v Ireland, the ECtHR highlighted that whilst the Convention sets forth what 
are essentially civil and political rights, many of these rights have implications of a social 
or economic nature. It concluded with the famous holding that there is no water-tight 
division separating these two categories of rights.161 Since then the ECtHR has confirmed 
this holistic approach on many occasions.162 As the ECHR applies to everyone within the 
jurisdiction of a State party,163 nothing would justify using a different approach in relation 
to foreign individuals. In addition, in Rahimi, the patent failure of the State to provide 
material support for the applicant was in clear breach with domestic legislation which 
                                                          
156 See Bossuyt, supra note 80 at 29-31 (arguing that the ECtHR has lowered the threshold of application of 
article 3 ECHR when the case relates to asylum seekers).  
157 See Ireland v. The United Kingdom, supra note 154, ¶ 162; Tyrer v. The United Kingdom, supra note 1544, 
¶ 29; Soering v. The United Kingdom, supra note 1544, ¶ 100. 
158 Id.. 
159 See supra at section II. 
160 See Bossuyt, supra note 80 at 32 (arguing that in its decisions M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece and Rahimi v. 
Greece the ECtHR transformed the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment 
which is a civil right that must be respected regardless of the available resources into a social right requiring 
considerable expenditure). 
161 Airey v. Ireland, supra note 1494, ¶ 26. 
162 See Lopez Ostra v. Spain, App. No. 16798/90 (Dec. 9, 1994) (about the pollution caused by a water 
treatment plant which was close to the applicant’s home); Öneryıldız v. Turkey, App. No. 48939/99 (Nov. 
30, 2004) (about the State obligation to inform the inhabitants of a slum near a rubbish tip about the risks 
of living there); Budayeva and others v. Russia, App. No.s 15339/02, 21166/02, 20058/02, 11673/02 and 
15343/02, (Mar. 20, 2008) (in the context of a mudslide which killed and injured the habitants of a village 
in Russia and the positive obligations of the State to take all appropriated measures to protect their lives).  
163 ECHR, supra note 99, art. 1; see also supra note 150. 
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explicitly required the State to provide care and appoint a legal guardian to all 
unaccompanied migrant children within its jurisdiction.164  
Essentially, there is nothing intrinsically new in the ECtHR’s approach to the 
application of article 3 ECHR to cases relating to migrant children. The Court is just 
applying its well-established jurisprudence to a novel situation which, sadly, occurs with 
ever greater frequency in light of the ongoing migration crisis in Europe. Therefore, the 
ECtHR has not created new obligations for States in this case.  
Similarly, in the domain of article 8 ECHR, considerations of the children’s best interest 
have always been a central element in decisions relating to nationals as opposed to foreign 
individuals. This is the case in decisions relating to parental authority and placement of 
children in foster care,165 determination of paternity,166 and adoption.167  
Accordingly, the main impact of the recognition of the migrant children’s vulnerability 
and application of the principle of best interests is the degree of the obligations imposed 
upon States by the ECtHR. The recognition of vulnerability operates as a magnifying 
glass,168 exposing a greater duty to protect and care owed by States in relation to the 
vulnerable individuals. In relation to the protection of migrant children’s rights, State 
authorities have a significant obligation to take the best interest of the child into account.169 
However, this does not imply the creation of new obligations to be imposed upon States. 
In contrast, new obligations could be expected from States in the Inter-American system. 
B. IACtHR: Potential for Innovation 
Comparatively, in the Inter-American context, the IACtHR is generally more prone to 
innovation and willing to impose a wider variety of obligations upon States.170  
                                                          
164 Article 19(1) and (2)(a) of the Presidential Decree 220/2007 on the transposition into the Greek 
legislation of the Directive 2003/9/EC laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers 
in Member States. 
165 See Palau-Martinez v. France, App. No. 64927/01, ¶ 42 (Dec. 16, 2003) (emphasising the necessity for 
State authorities to take into account children’s “real interests” while deciding on parental authority and 
custody issues).  
166 See Mikulić v. Croatia, App. No. 53176/99, ¶ 65 (Feb. 7, 2002) (affirming that “in determining an 
application to have paternity established, the courts are required to have regard to the basic principle of the 
child’s interests”). 
167 See Fretté v. France, App. No. 36515/97, ¶ 42 (Feb. 26, 2002) (considering that the right to adopt is 
limited by considerations of best interests of the child); Chbihi Loudoudi and Others v. Belgium, App. No. 
52265/10, ¶ 97 (Dec. 16, 2014) (affirming that the best interest of the child is a component of the right to 
respect of family life and should be paramount to decisions of the domestic courts relating to adoption of 
children under the Islamic system of Kafala).  
168 See Peroni & Timmer, supra note 19 at 1079. 
169 See supra at section III.  
170 See LAURENCE BURGORGUE-LARSEN & AMAYA UBEDA DE TORRES, THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS. CASE LAW AND COMMENTARY 224 (2011) (arguing that the IACtHR’s approach to 
reparations is innovative and forward looking); Ana Beduschi, The Contribution of the Inter-American Court of 
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For instance, the Inter-American Court has imposed novel responsibilities upon States 
in relation to their obligation to identify non-national children who require international 
protection within their jurisdiction.171 For instance, it held that States should provide 
training for professionals performing initial assessments in age and gender sensitive related 
interviewing techniques.172 Similarly, the IACtHR has imposed the obligation to guarantee 
that the administrative or judicial proceedings concerning the rights of migrant children 
are adapted to their needs and are accessible to them.173 It based the justification for such 
an obligation on the necessity to ensure that the best interests of the child is a paramount 
consideration in all the decisions adopted.174 Importantly, this obligation may entail 
significant changes to domestic laws and policies. It implies, for example, that decisions 
on migratory matters involving migrant children should not be delegated to non-
specialised officials175 and that special attention should be paid to migrant children’s non-
verbal forms of communication.176  
The IACtHR’s leeway in imposing such a variety of obligations upon States can be 
explained by the general mandate given to it by articles 1(1)177 and 2178 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR). Indeed, the IACtHR interprets these provisions 
as the basis for a general obligation of States to adapt their domestic legislation to the 
ACHR.179  
The recognition of migrant children’s vulnerability180 is equally crucial for the 
determination of the nature and degree of State obligations in the Inter-American system. 
For instance, the IACtHR clearly established in its influential Advisory Opinion no 21 that  
                                                          
Human Rights to the Protection of Irregular Immigrants’ Rights: Opportunities and Challenges, 34 REFUGEE SURVEY 
QUARTERLY 45, 63-5 (2015) (arguing that the IACtHR is at the forefront of an innovative approach to 
reparations in the field of the protection of irregular immigrants’ rights).  
171 Id., operative ¶ 3. 
172 Id., at ¶ 85. 
173 Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, supra note 21 at operative ¶ 4. 
174 Id. 
175 Id., at ¶ 121. 
176 Id., at ¶ 122. 
177 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M 673 (1970), art. 1(1) (“The States Parties 
to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all 
persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any 
discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.”). 
178 Id. art. 2 (“Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in article 1 is not already 
ensured by legislative or other provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their 
constitutional processes and the provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be 
necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms.”). 
179 Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, supra note 21, ¶ 65. See Laurens Lavrysen, Positive Obligations in the 
Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 2 INT. AM. & EUR. HUM. RTS. J. 95, 96-7 (2014) 
(discussing the wide array of positive obligations recognised by the IACtHR). 
180 Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, supra note 21, ¶ 71 (emphasising the situation of additional vulnerability of 
migrant children). 
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States must accord priority to a human rights-based approach, from a 
crosscut perspective that takes into consideration the rights of the child and, 
in particular, the protection and comprehensive development of the child, 
which should have priority over any consideration of nationality or migratory 
status, in order to ensure the full exercise of their rights.181 
Certainly, these obligations were introduced by the IACtHR in an advisory opinion, a 
non-binding interpretation of the law.182 Nevertheless, the Advisory Opinion OC-21 is 
definitely noteworthy. It comprehensively illustrates the IACtHR’s general views on the 
topic and forms the basis for the development of its decisions in the future.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The ECtHR’s understanding of the concept of vulnerability in cases relating to migrant 
children, although not exempt from criticisms, can contribute to the strengthening of the 
protection of their rights. By developing a contextual analysis of their composite 
vulnerability, the ECtHR has avoided the risk of excessive stigmatisation of this category 
of individuals.183 We should welcome the Court’s emphasis on the complementarity 
between vulnerability and the principle of best interests of the child, given that it reinforces 
the need for special measures of protection.184  
Yet, the example of its Inter-American counterpart demonstrates that the European 
Court could indeed do more.185 It took the ECtHR until 2016186 to directly refer to the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child’s General Comment No. 6187 while integrating the 
principle of best interests from article 3 CRC. Nonetheless, even the 2016 reference was 
not dispositive as the principle of best interests was not even applied in the case in 
question.188  
                                                          
181 Id., at operative ¶ 2. 
182 Hugh Thirlway, Advisory Opinions, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 
1 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2008) (“An advisory opinion is a judicial opinion, most frequently given by a 
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183 See supra at section II. 
184 See supra at section III.A. 
185 Id. 
186 Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v. Malta, supra note 20, ¶ 56. 
187 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 6, supra note 6. 
188 See supra at section III.B. 
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Hence, the ECtHR is considerably instrumental in its use of this principle. If, on the 
contrary, the ECtHR allowed the Committee on the Rights of the Child’s child-centred 
views on the justifications of migrant children detention189 to robustly penetrate the realm 
of the ECHR, that would bring the much-needed consistency to the understanding of the 
principle of best interests in the specific context of ECHR rights and liberties.  
Despite its diffident approach in terms of detention, the ECtHR’s recognition of 
migrant children’s composite vulnerability and consideration of their best interests have 
contributed to the imposition of enhanced obligations upon States.190 The Court’s 
approach is the most visible in relation to the existing positive obligations. Unlike the 
IACtHR, the ECtHR does not create new obligations in the field of the protection of 
migrant children’s rights.191 The European Court’s recognition of vulnerability only 
operates as a magnifying glass, exposing a greater duty to protect and care imposed upon 
States, which is further reinforced by the application of the principle of best interests of 
the child.192  
On balance, both the identification of their composite vulnerability, and recourse to 
the principle of best interests, embrace and foster the need for further protection of 
migrant children’s rights. In view of the current global migration crisis, and the growing 
number of unaccompanied or separated migrant children, a more substantial child-
oriented approach to international migration is certainly needed. The ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence is slowly evolving in this direction. Notwithstanding, this process will still 
require a great dose of persistence and determination. 
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